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1. Introduction 
 
Truth does not purport to solve all or even any of the philosophical problems that revolve 
around the nature of truth. According to the authors, Alexis Burgess and John Burgess, the 
aim of the book is only to survey contemporary work on these problems rather than give a 
systematic defense of some alleged solutions to them. That, one might think, is a modest 
task. However, upon reading this book, one realizes it is not, in fact, a modest task—
particularly if the survey is to be comprehensible to those who are not especially familiar 
with recent work on truth.   
 
To begin with, one has to find a way to balance the formal aspects of the theory of truth—
e.g. formal solutions to the liar paradox found in the work of Tarski and Kripke—with less 
formal aspects—e.g. whether truth could be understood as a kind of correspondence with 
the world. What’s more, one has to do justice to any number of philosophers who have 
wanted to take truth captive to serve their own philosophical purposes—whether in 
metaphysics, epistemology, logic, or the philosophy of language. Burgess and Burgess 
handle these and other obstacles elegantly. They show excellent judgment in carefully 
selecting what positions to discuss. When they raise some claim for consideration, they 
pursue it just long enough for the reader to appreciate what’s at issue and just briefly 
enough so that reader isn’t ensnared by thorny details. Their explanations of formal material 
are accurate and pleasant to read. Their presentation of less formal material is crisp, precise, 
and charming. 
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The preface of the books indicates that the book is an introduction intended for “advanced 
undergraduate or beginning graduate students of philosophy, or the general reader with 
some philosophical background.” The book is well suited for this purpose. I wish that I had 
had this book when I began thinking about truth as a graduate student. I might have made 
considerable more progress in my thinking. 
 
While a number of topics appear in the book, there are two principal themes. One theme is 
that the equivalence principle—“Saying something is true is equivalent to just saying it” (p. 
8)—faces a number of technical problems. The most salient of these problems is perhaps the 
liar paradox. The liar paradox comes up in the treatment of Tarski (Chapter Three) and 
Kripke (Chapter Seven), but also receives more thorough and direct discussion in Chapter 
Eight. In addition to the liar paradox, the authors also reckon with the problems created by 
presupposition and vagueness in Chapter Four. 
 
For this review, I will focus on a second theme: the debate between deflationism and 
(varieties of) non-deflationism. This debate is the focus of Chapters One, Three, Five, and 
Six.   
 
2.  In Defense of a Deflationary Perspective 
 
Although the book is written as an introduction of sorts, the authors do not pretend to be 
writing from a neutral standpoint. Burgess and Burgess express sympathy for a deflationary 
theory of truth. Deflationary theories of truth are closely associated with the equivalence 
principle given above. But, to some extent, this association is misleading since all theorists 
should aspire to embrace the equivalence principle (at least insofar as the liar paradox 
allows). Everybody should admit that one can recover the truth conditions for a truth bearer 
by using the truth bearer itself. What distinguishes deflationary theories is their austerity: 
there’s not much else to say about the nature of the concept of truth or truth itself that isn’t 
captured by this recipe for recovering truth conditions. 
 
The opponent of deflationary theories of truth thus faces the challenge of explaining what a 
deflationary theory of truth has left out. In fact, this is not simply a challenge that must be 
confronted in the pursuit of defeating deflationism. It is a challenge that must be confronted 
merely in order to clearly delineate an alternative. Burgess and Burgess consider a number 
of possible ways of confronting this challenge. I will mention three:   
 
(1) In Chapter Three (p. 47), Burgess and Burgess consider the possibility that 
deflationism has left out that truth is a property. However, as they adeptly point out, 
whether we should say that truth is a property depends perhaps more on what being 
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a property turns out to be than what truth does. (Indeed, the nature of properties is, 
arguably, murkier than the nature of truth, making it difficult for the former to shed 
much light on the latter.)   
 
(2) In the middle of Chapter Five (pp. 72–3), Burgess and Burgess consider the 
possibility that what has been left out is the truthmaking relation that holds between 
a true truth bearer and some (existing) aspect of reality. In response, they note David 
Lewis’s observation: ‘truthmaking’ may be something of a misnomer as it does not 
seem to have much to do with truth at all. Those preoccupied by truthmaking seem 
attracted to the thought that how things are is entirely due to what there is, or in 
other words, that any kind of theoretical commitment—even to a simple claim to the 
effect that snow is white—must ultimately be, come with, or stem from an 
ontological commitment. Interesting as this thought might be, it doesn’t really seem 
to be a thought about truth per se. The thought seems to be that, for instance, snow’s 
being white has an ontological basis or at least ontological implications. Of course, 
if this is so for snow’s being white, then it is also so for <Snow is white>’s—that is 
to say the proposition’s—truth. But, the latter seems to be entirely a consequence of 
the equivalence principle and the fact that snow’s being white is explanatorily prior 
to <Snow is white>’s being true. Yet, the equivalence principle and this explanatory 
asymmetry appear to be wholly consonant with deflationism. 
 
(3) Finally, at the end of Chapter Five (pp. 79–82), Burgess and Burgess consider the 
possibility that what has been left out is the normative dimension, e.g. that true 
propositions are just those that are permissible to assert. On behalf of the 
deflationist, they suggest that although some such normative principle may well 
hold, what need not follow is that truth has a normative dimension per se. They 
recommend the following test for the latter claim: the normative principle must be 
“part of the very meaning of the truth predicate” (p. 80). Then, they attempt to tell a 
story where the normative principle is neither part of the very meaning of the truth 
predicate, nor even part of the very meaning of ‘assertion.’   
 
Here is the gist of the story. To a first approximation, children learn particular 
instances the form: 
 
(a) It is permissible to use ‘p’ in ordinary circumstances if and only if p.     
 
More precisely, children acquire knowledge of the norms disciplining language-use 
piecewise. However, we can give a recipe that indicates, for any sentence ‘p’, what 
it is that children are learning in a piecewise manner. The permissible conditions for 
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using ‘p’ in ordinary circumstances are learned to be those specified by using a 
sentence with the same propositional content as ‘p’. After acquiring these individual 
pieces of knowledge (probably tacitly), the children learn how to use ‘assertion’ and 
the truth predicate in order to generalize from these particular instances to the 
normative principle: 
 
(b) It is permissible to use ‘p’ to make an assertion if and only if ‘p’ is true. 
 
However, this normative principle is not built into the meanings of either ‘assertion’ 
or the truth predicate. Rather, children learn the meaning of ‘true’ just by learning 
the equivalence principle while they learn ‘assertion’ to refer to a kind of language-
use that occurs in ordinary circumstances.   
 
Of replies (1)–(3) on behalf of deflationism, it is this last reply that I find least convincing. 
In the remainder of this review, I will subject it to further scrutiny.   
 
Before I do so, however, it is worth emphasizing Burgess and Burgess do not intend for the 
reply recounted in (3) to be especially conclusive. The intention is clearly to provoke further 
thought on the matter. Consequently, my remarks should merely be understood as carrying 
the discussion further rather than indicating any serious problem in the discussion as it is 
presented in the book. Indeed, the fact that the discussion in book does a good job at 
provoking further thought is a manifestation of the book’s success. 
 
3.  Problems with the Defense in (3) 
 
When it comes to the reply given in (3), there are at least two obvious areas for concern. 
First, one might worry about the adequacy of the recommended test for determining 
whether truth has a normative aspect per se. The issue here is, of course, the nature of truth 
itself rather than the truth predicate or the concept of truth. Consequently, there is the 
theoretical possibility that although normativity is not part of the very meaning of the truth 
predicate, this is simply because not every feature of truth itself is reflected in the meaning 
of the truth predicate. For instance, the truth predicate might refer to a property with a 
normative dimension even though some competent users of the truth predicate are not aware 
of this normative dimension. Indeed, perhaps the inference from predicating truth to 
predicating permissible assertability (and vice-versa) is even valid (in a significant sort of 
way), but appreciating the validity of this inference requires more than merely grasping the 
meaning of the truth predicate. Maybe this appreciation requires more sophisticated insight. 
This insight might be empirically grounded, but it might also have a purely rational basis. 
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A second worry is that even if the recounted language-acquisition story is true, it is not 
sufficient to establish that a normative principle like (b) is not part of the meaning of the 
truth predicate. Consider the predicate ‘is a number’. I don’t know exactly what children 
learn when they learn this predicate, but it isn’t very far-fetched to suspect that they don’t 
learn everything that is part of the meaning of ‘is a number’. In fact, we might take seriously 
the possibility that one doesn’t really learn everything that is part of the meaning of ‘is a 
number’ until one is well into one’s mathematical studies at university. Indeed, we might 
think that, at some point in the past, nobody fully grasped the meaning of the predicate ‘is a 
number’; all competent users of the predicate merely had a loose grasp on this meaning. By 
parity of reasoning, perhaps children do not gain a full grasp of the meaning of the truth 
predicate until they find their way to normative principles such as (b). 
 
In fact, these two worries give rise to a kind of dialectical dilemma. Consider (C):   
 
(C) Merely competent users of a predicate fully grasp the predicate’s meaning.   
 
Whether the first or second worry is more pressing for Burgess and Burgess depends on 
whether (C) is a constraint on meaning. 
 
Suppose (C) is indeed a constraint on meaning. Then, the second worry isn’t so pressing. 
There’s no scope for worrying that there’s more to the meaning of the truth predicate than 
the children in language-acquisition story are learning before they find their way to 
normative principles such as (b). But, the first worry is pressing. Upon accepting (C), 
there’s no very good motivation for accepting the recommended test for determining 
whether truth has a normative dimension. It might really be that the conception of truth that 
comes with fully grasping the truth predicate simply leaves out the normative dimension of 
truth. To appreciate this dimension of truth, one may well need insight that goes beyond 
what a merely competent user of the truth predicate has. 
 
Suppose (C) isn’t a constraint on meaning. Given that competent users may only have a 
loose grasp on the meaning of the truth predicate, it may well be that quite a bit about truth 
is built into the meaning of the truth predicate even though the nature of truth isn’t fully 
transparent to competent users. So, perhaps any normative dimension of truth also won’t be 
left out of the meaning of the truth predicate. This would vindicate the test that Burgess and 
Burgess recommend for determining whether truth has a normative dimension. So, the first 
worry goes away. However, this vindication comes at the price of greatly exacerbating the 
second worry. Now, there’s plenty of scope for worrying that while children have managed 
to become competent users of the truth predicate without construing truth as normative, still 
some or other normative principles are part of the meaning of the truth predicate. It’s just 
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that these normative principles are part of the meaning of the truth predicate that isn’t fully 
grasped merely in virtue of being a competent user of the truth predicate. 
 
Given this dialectical dilemma, I can’t see that the language-acquisition story that Burgess 
and Burgess give—which, incidentally, I find plausible enough—does much to help the 
deflationist. It simply does not provide much reason to think that the deflationist has not left 
truth’s normative dimension out of the theory of truth. 
 
In fact, the position that Burgess and Burgess take in their defense of deflationism is 
vulnerable in at least one further crucial respect. One is left with the impression that they are 
conceding that there are two meanings that are viable candidates for the meaning of the 
truth predicate. One of these meanings has normative principles such as (b) built in while 
the other is a deflationary meaning that has only the equivalence principle. However, once it 
is conceded that there are two such viable candidates, then the theoretical possibility exists 
that the truth predicate could turn out to have the first normative meaning rather than the 
second deflationary meaning. Even supposing that this theoretical possibility is not 
realized—the truth predicate, in fact, has the second deflationary meaning—still it would 
appear that, in principle, there could be some truth* predicate that had the first normative 
meaning. Corresponding to this truth* predicate will be something—truth*—that, unlike 
truth, has a normative dimension. Because the equivalence principle is also built into the 
truth* predicate, the truth* predicate would be just as useful a device for making 
generalizations as the truth predicate is. But, of course, the normative dimension of truth* 
might make it a more interesting thing to study than truth; it might be that there are a variety 
of devices we might have used for making generalizations, but that one—the truth* 
predicate—is singled out from the others by its strong connection with normative 
assessment. We might learn that deflationism is, strictly speaking, right, but there is 
something more interesting in the neighborhood of truth for which a deflationary theory is 
not adequate. It strikes me that this would be a fairly shallow victory for deflationism.    
 
Of course, the initial impression could be misleading: perhaps Burgess and Burgess do not 
think that there are two meanings that are viable candidates for the meaning of the truth 
predicate. Perhaps they think that there is only the deflationary meaning (or, perhaps more 
accurately, deflationary meanings). But, if this is what they think, then the detour through 
language-acquisition is a bit of a red herring. Really, it wouldn’t have matter whether 
children had acquired the truth predicate in part by learning that it was a feature of this 
predicate that using it involved making normative assessments of potential assertions. This 
would simply have been a way of acquiring the truth predicate that simultaneously involved 
internalizing a misconception about truth—that truth has a normative dimension. In that 
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case, the interesting question would be why there isn’t a viable candidate for the meaning of 
the truth predicate that builds in normative principles such as (b). 
 
4.  Concluding Thoughts 
 
In the previous section, I argued that a defense that Burgess and Burgess give of 
deflationism is ineffective. They fail to effectively rebut the Dummettian claim that truth 
has a normative dimension. While my argument might be taken to indicate a weakness of 
their book, I hope that it, in fact, illustrates a strength instead. As I noted in §2, while Truth 
is a survey of recent work on truth, it is not written from a neutral perspective. I am 
sympathetic to their perspective on a number of points, which is why I included in §2 not 
only a point of disagreement but the points enumerated in (1) and (2) where I more or less 
agree with them. However, even the ensuing discussion on the point of disagreement should 
demonstrate the way in which a not-so-neutral perspective can be helpful. By taking a 
judicious stand on a variety of issues, Burgess and Burgess not only advance their own 
views; they help to focus opposition to those same views. As a result, they are quite good at 
directing conversation in a productive direction. This is exactly what one wants from a 
survey book of this sort, and why I would not hesitate to use this book in advanced 
undergraduate or graduate course on truth.   
 
 
